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INVESTING IN THE FUTURE: 
EDUCATION IN THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL REPRODUCTION OF NORTH INDIAN MUSLIMS 
Patricia Jeffery, Roger Jeffery and Craig Jeffrey 
 
Remember: 
 Ignorance is darkness and education is enlightenment 
 The understanding of religion and the world comes only from education  
 Education gives us a peaceful life 
 Education helps us to get ahead and develop 
 Education makes us capable of helping our country and our people 
 Do not deprive your children of education 
 Enrol the people close to you in a madrasah or school and turn them into good 
human beings and good urbane people 
This exhortation features on an Urdu poster printed by an Aligarh-based Urdu committee. 
The village pradhan, a Muslim peasant farmer and part-time roads contractor, had pinned it 
to the veranda wall in his home.1 It encapsulates central ideas in discourses of modernity that 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council (grant R00238495), the Ford 
Foundation, and the Royal Geographical Society for funding the research in Bijnor District 
(UP) on which this paper is based, and to the Institute of Economic Growth, New Delhi, for 
our attachment there in 2000-2. None bears any responsibility for what we have written here. 
We are also grateful to our research assistants, Swaleha Begum, Shaila Rais, Chhaya Sharma, 
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have been circulating in India since colonial times: that education is beneficial for individuals 
and the nation alike, because it brings enlightenment and the educated person attains the 
status of civilised human being. Such perceptions are part of very general understandings of 
the importance of education in contemporary India. Indeed, more than half of the President’s 
address to the nation on August 14th 2004 was devoted to emphasising the importance of the 
education system ‘in creating an enlightened, dynamic and prosperous society’ and 
transforming ‘a human being into a wholesome whole, a noble soul and an asset to the 
universe.’ In line with very widespread assumptions, President Abdul Kalam sees illiteracy as 
one of the root causes of poverty.  
This view is not so much wrong as partial, for poverty itself is a major reason for illiteracy 
and low levels of educational attainment. This has never been more so than in today’s rapidly 
changing economic and global situation—and it applies as forcefully to India’s Muslims as to 
the rest of the Indian population. The commonplace trope of the ‘backward Muslim’ (and 
especially the uneducated Muslim woman) tends to blame the ‘victims’ for their own 
backwardness. Here, we want to challenge such assumptions by confronting the role played 
by systemic social, economic and political processes in the educational careers and prospects 
of Muslim children in India.  
In 21st century India, everyone has to contend with economic liberalisation, globalisation 
and the scramble for employment and economic security. Formal education is becoming 
increasingly significant in people’s attempts to reproduce or improve the social and economic 
positions of their households. Children may have to spend several years of their childhood 
                                                                                                                                                         
and Manjula Sharma, to the people of Qaziwala and Nangal Jat, the school and madrasah 
staff, and many others who so readily answered our questions.  
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notching up examinations successes and imbibing the General Knowledge and social polish 
on which social and economic success rests. But people are able to rise to these challenges in 
rather different ways. Wealthy urbanites have both the economic capital to enable their 
children to obtain educational credentials and the social networks to facilitate their 
transitions to adulthood. Extensive schooling, lucrative and secure ‘modern’ jobs, and ‘good’ 
marriages are beyond the reach of the poor.  
Most Muslims in India, however, do not have the social and economic capital with which 
to succeed in this rapidly changing situation. Like their neighbours from other communities, 
Indian Muslims occupy a range of occupational and class positions. In general, though, 
Muslims in independent India have been economically marginalised and they are 
disproportionately located towards the lower end of the socio-economic hierarchy (Shariff 
1995). Muslims in western UP, for instance, suffered a general decline in their relative 
economic and political position after 1947, in part because of excess migration of the urban 
and rural elites to Pakistan (Brass 1974: 182ff.). Today, Muslim children are significantly less 
likely to be enrolled in so-called secular schooling than children from other communities, 
and, once registered, Muslim boys are more likely to drop out before completing primary 
schooling. Muslim girls, once into school, are as likely to complete as are Hindu girls 
(Siddiqui 2004: 94-98). Many Muslim children—especially from poor rural households—
receive formal education only briefly, if at all. Muslim literacy rates are probably lower than 
among caste Hindus, especially in the rural areas. Many Muslim children continue to be 
educated informally, often learning by watching their parents at work. Urban Muslims, in 
particular, are likely to be artisans, many of whom are largely educated through 
apprenticeships (Hameed 2005; Kumar 1988). Somewhat higher up the economic scale, 
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families may struggle to educate their children via a range of educational institutions. The 
poor recruitment of Muslims into the IAS and the professions since 1947, however, reflects 
the relatively small numbers of urban middle class Muslims who have been able to provide 
their children with lengthy formal schooling. Poverty and residence affect Muslims’ ability to 
navigate changing educational markets, much as they do for Hindus. But communal politics 
play an additional and pernicious role for Muslims.  
The future of Muslim children’s education must be viewed in a framework that 
accommodates the diversity of Muslims’ social and economic positions at the same time as it 
encompasses overarching processes. First we shall lay out some general features of the 
situation in UP, where several aspects render Muslims’ minority status and general economic 
marginality particularly acute. Later, we shall use our research in Bijnor district to explore 
how these processes operate. We focus on secondary schooling, since this is crucial for 
obtaining the cultural capital and credentials that are crucial for boys (and a few girls) in the 
employment market, and for both girls and boys in marriage markets. Briefly, this is a story of 
failing state provision, privatisation of educational provision and diversification of Muslim 
children’s educational careers accompanied by the saffronisation of educational cultures and 
an increasing communal separation of pupils.  
Political economy of education in Uttar Pradesh 
The Uttar Pradesh state has consistently accorded education a low priority in its 
spending. In the 1990s, evidence accumulated of the UP state’s abject failure to provide 
comprehensive, accessible, affordable, and good quality schools for the mass of the 
population, especially for villagers and the urban poor (Govinda 2002; The Probe Team 
1999). Locally dominant castes and classes actively contributed to this outcome. They have 
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also been the best placed to take advantage of shifts in the wider economy to market 
liberalisation, a process that has accelerated since 1991. 
Between 1960 and 1990, teachers’ unions pressurised the state government to 
nationalise schools (a trend that has now been reversed, especially in the secondary sector). 
The salaries of the (overwhelmingly upper caste Hindu) teachers still on the government 
payroll now absorb the lion’s share of the UP education budget. This skewing has subsidised 
the urban middle classes at the expense of expanding educational provisions serving the rural 
population and the poor (Kingdon & Muzammil 2001). With growing cohorts of school age 
children, there are too few government schools and teachers to meet the potential demand, 
especially in the rural areas. Further, decisions about where to build government schools are 
not based simply on population size and ‘need’. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Hindu urban 
middle classes and dominant landowning castes could manipulate their connections (often 
through relatives) into an educational officialdom dominated by upper caste Hindus. Like the 
lower Hindu castes and the Scheduled Castes, Muslims had little leverage over the ‘Hindi 
establishment’ that dominated UP’s educational institutions.2 Rural schools were more likely 
to be constructed in villages or sections of villages dominated by Hindu upper castes than 
near Muslim majority villages. Generally, the fabric of the rural school buildings is poor and 
teaching materials are more inadequate than in urban schools. High levels of teacher 
absenteeism and shirking compound the general problem of recruiting staff for rural posts. 
                                                 
2 ‘Scheduled Castes’ are castes previouslytermed ‘Untouchables’ or ‘Harijan’. They are 
included on a government ‘schedule’ and entitled to benefit from certain government 
programmes. The term ‘Dalit’ [oppressed] is not commonly used in western UP.  
The Future of Muslims in India/ Investing in the Future 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These inadequacies are even more glaring in schools located in Muslim dominated villages or 
muhallās. In practice, government schools rarely provide free education and regular 
attendance by pupils is often significantly lower than enrolments. Drèze and Kingdon 
consider that low attendance rates among rural Muslims are due more to ‘tangible 
disadvantages such as poverty and low levels of parental education’ than to parental 
opposition to schooling (Drèze & Kingdon 2001; see also Srivastava 2001: 280). Muslim 
pupils, moreover, are rarely entitled to the benefits—problematic though they are—of 
government scholarships, which probably enhance SC enrolments in comparison with others 
from similar economic backgrounds (Srivastava 2001).  
With the UP state’s fiscal crisis during the 1990s, real per capita expenditure on 
education and numbers of teachers per capita declined (Drèze & Gazdar 1997; Drèze & 
Kingdon 1998; Drèze & Sen 2002: 143-88; Srivastava 2001; The Probe Team 1999). 
Meanwhile, there has been a remarkable growth in private and government-aided schools and 
colleges since the mid 1980s, primarily in response to the UP government’s failure to provide 
minimally adequate schooling for the majority of its population. The process of privatisation 
has accelerated during the 1990s and may compensate somewhat for the shortfall in state 
provision. It does not redress inequities in access, however (Jeffery et al. 2005b; Jeffery et al. 
2005c). Indeed, the educational market reflects (and probably reproduces) pre-existing 
inequalities. The new educational institutions normally rely on fees and other levies from 
pupils’ parents (e.g. ‘donations’ to obtain admission). Generally, the founders locate their 
institutions—particularly secondary schools—where they can benefit from the growing 
demand for schooling from concentrations of moderately wealthy upper caste Hindu families: 
in other words, in urban centres or small towns (Drèze & Gazdar 1997: 71; NCERT 1997: Table 
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V 17 & Table V 41). The rural poor in particular have very few options, especially for young 
children who cannot travel far alone: their school attendance rates are generally the lowest 
(Drèze & Gazdar 1997: 80; Srivastava 2001). Indeed, aside from the fees, providing transport 
or arranging for children to board with urban relatives poses severe problems even for 
relatively wealthy villagers. Most non-state institutions, then, effectively exclude poor or 
marginal populations—including most Muslims.  
Girls have been amongst the least well served by the UP education sector and gender 
differentials in school attendance, literacy and educational attainment remain wide (Drèze & 
Gazdar 1997; Drèze & Sen 2002: 143-188 & 229-274; Karlekar 2000; The Probe Team 1999; 
Wazir 2000).3 General problems of girls’ access to education are exacerbated for Muslims 
because schools are unlikely to be in Muslim dominated villages or urban muhallās. In 
education, as in other fields, there is a general problem of recruiting and retaining women for 
rural posts, whether in the government or private sector (Drèze & Gazdar 1997: 61, 68-69; 
                                                 
3 Using data from the 1991 national census and the 1992-3 National Family Health Survey, 
Drèze and Sen estimate that rural enrolment rates in UP in the early 1990s were 43% of girls 
and 70% of boys aged 6-14; the urban rates were 70% and 77% respectively. Some 44% of girls 
never enrolled in school, compared to 19% of boys. Only 30% of girls aged 15-19 had 
completed 8th class, compared with 55% of boys (Drèze & Sen 2002: 147). More recent data 
(e.g. from 1997-8 (Nayar 2001) and from the 2001 Census (supplied in electronic format File 
ST2001RU, Table 1)), show little material change in the differentials. Girls’ chances of 
enrolling at school and becoming literate are closely related to their mothers’ education, 
which in part explains the low levels of girls’ school enrolment in areas—like Bijnor—with low 
levels of adult female literacy (Drèze & Kingdon 2001; Srivastava 2001: 271).  
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Nayar 2001: 43). Unless there are compelling financial difficulties, women’s employment 
outside the home is widely frowned upon—especially if it entails working with men, or 
travelling to villages (which are believed to be dangerous for unaccompanied women). 
Employed women must usually continue to perform their domestic duties, whilst the time and 
cost of travelling to work are further disincentives. Not surprisingly, most women teachers are 
in urban or large village schools, mainly in the primary sector. Like many other parents, 
Muslim parents may hesitate to enrol their daughters if few local girls are attending school, if 
the school is too distant or if there are no female teachers (The Probe Team 1999: 18ff.). Rural 
schools often fail to provide girl-friendly environments (e.g. separate toilet facilities), and 
there is evidence of gender bias by teachers as well as in the curriculum (Karlekar 2000). 
Parents are often worried about sexual harassment on the way to school (Srivastava 2001: 
305). For the poor, for villagers and for Muslims, the most acceptable—as well as affordable—
option may be to curtail their daughters’ education once they reach puberty. Indeed, Muslim 
girls were all but absent even in the primary schools in our research villages.  
The education sector in UP (and north India as a whole) is characterised by long-
standing exclusionary class and residence biases that have been especially (though not 
exclusively) disadvantageous to most Muslims. Simply put, most Muslim parents in UP have 
inadequate opportunities to provide for their children’s education, however strongly they 
want to do so. 
Saffronised educational cultures 
In general, north Indian Muslims confront much the same systematic exclusionary 
processes as their poor neighbours from other castes and communities. Another layer needs 
unwrapping here, though: communal politics. The role of the dominant classes and castes in 
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determining the location of schools by no means exhausts the communal issues involved in 
education. Thus, we turn now to the ambience of schools in north India, particularly focusing 
on the medium of instruction, aspects of curriculum and the domination of teaching by upper 
caste Hindus (Jeffery et al. 2004).  
Urdu in the Persian script occupied a prime position among the vernacular languages 
in official business and in publications well into the 20th century. But the ‘Hindi 
establishment’ (many of whom were employed in the colonial education administration) 
gradually dominated in curriculum development and the expansion of teaching Hindi in 
Devanagari script in schools and colleges (Orsini 2002).4 Urdu and Hindi became ‘symbolic 
links among members of the same ethnic group, barriers to communication between 
members of different ethnic groups, and additional marks of identity and separateness for 
such groups’ (Brass, 1991: 85). Since 1947, Urdu has been widely seen as an alien language 
and a threat to national unity and its decline has been precipitate.5 It ceased to be an official 
language of UP in 1951 and was relegated to ‘minority language’ status: repeated efforts to get 
Urdu recognised as UP’s second official language have failed. Given the Constitutional 
guarantees to provide ‘mother tongue’ teaching for minorities at primary school level and the 
‘three language formula’ as applied to UP (Hindi, English and another Indian language), Urdu 
might have achieved some prominence in school curricula. It is, however, marginal. As a 
medium of instruction, Urdu is now largely restricted to the madrasah sector (see below). 
                                                 
4 See also {King, 1994 #1945; Rai, 2001 #1946}. 
5 For more on the contemporary position of Urdu in UP, see: (Abdullah 2002; Ahmad 2002; 
Brass 1974: 119-274; Brass 1990: 135ff.; Brass 1991: 69-108; Farouqui 1994; Latifi 1999; Pai 
2002; Rahman 2002: 198-262; Russell 1999; Venkatachaliah 1999).  
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Few schools even offer Urdu, although it became an optional subject in some government 
primary schools in the 1990s.6 It is rarely an option as a literary subject in secondary schools. 
By contrast, most schools are Hindi-medium, a highly Sanskritised version of Hindi is 
valorised in the school curriculum and Sanskrit itself is generally taken as the third language. 
Thus, the linguistic ambience of UP schools tends to marginalise and denigrate the vernacular 
non-elite forms of Hindi spoken by most villagers and the poor (Kumar 1991; Kumar 1993; 
Orsini 2002; Rai 2001). For the Muslims among them, problems of script compound those of 
vocabulary. Urdu facilitates children’s access to Islam, including reading the Qur’ān Sharīf—
Hindi in the Devanagari script does not.  
English complicates this linguistic contest, of course. Initially, English was to occupy 
the position of a national language in independent India only as an interim measure (Brass 
1990: 135ff.). As an international language, however, English is a stronger currency than 
Hindi in the employment market, in India and abroad ((Deshpande 2000; Mohan 2000; 
Srivastava 2000). As Faust and Nagar (2001) argue, English-medium schooling is socially and 
politically divisive, however. The higher fees charged in English-medium schools not only 
indicate the greater prestige of English in comparison with Hindi but put competence in 
English out of reach of most Hindus, leave aside most Muslims. In the language stakes, then, 
Urdu has been doubly marginalised, by English as well as by Sanskritised Hindi. But only 
relatively affluent and courageous rural Muslim parents—like wealthy Hindus—could send 
their sons to English-medium fee-paying schools; even fewer send their daughters—in 
                                                 
6 Many Muslims in Bijnor expressed widespread cynicism about the qualifications of staff 
appointed to teach Urdu, and considered the move a political ploy by Mayavati and Mulayam 
Singh Yadav in their competition for Muslim votes, rather than a commitment to Urdu.  
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Bijnor’s leading English-medium secondary schools, dominated by Hindus, boys outnumber 
girls about 1.9:1.  
Most UP schools are also characterised by curricula—formal and hidden—that 
presume that the pupils are Hindu and that tend to marginalise and even demean Muslims. 
This largely pre-dates the overt and official saffronising of school curricula under the auspices 
of the BJP government in the late 1990s. The ‘institutional stranglehold’ (Orsini 2002: 382) of 
the Hindi establishment over education had ossified the UP Education Board Hindi literature 
courses and they still contain narratives of Indian history, mythology and Hindi literature in 
which Muslims are portrayed in a negative light. Sanskrit itself is associated with the Hindu 
scriptures. The Hindu bias of the syllabus has long been a matter of concern to Muslim 
commentators (see, for instance, (Brass 1974). Yet the recent debates about NCERT textbooks 
and school syllabi more generally have focused on History, Social Science, and Vedic 
Mathematics and Astrology rather than Hindi (Sahmat 2001; 2002a; 2002b). The 
government elected in 2004 has committed itself to removing the most explicitly saffronised 
elements from school curricula. But this will be insufficient to remove the biases against 
Muslim children, who experience educational regimes that tend to denigrate and humiliate 
them, even if they are not attending the Arya Samaj or RSS schools that might have less subtle 
anti-Muslim agendas (Balagopalan & Subramanian 2003; Kumar 1989: 59-77; 1993) (Thapar 
2005). Muslims themselves often allege that teachers are unsympathetic (if not overtly 
unpleasant) to Muslim pupils, that they display favouritism in marking schoolwork or 
accepting pupils for tuitions.  
The continuing domination of school teaching in general by upper caste Hindus is 
crucial here. Most schools—government schools included—exhibit ‘banal Hinduism’ (cf. Billig 
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1995), the taken-for-granted yet insidious practices that tend to construct an upper caste 
Hindu ambience. There is no formal timetabling of religious instruction in most schools, but 
textbooks and lessons are not the only medium through which religion is ‘taught’: daily 
assemblies and other functions, such as Founders’ Days and January 26th celebrations, are 
replete with Hindu iconography and Sanskritised Hindi (cf. Bénéï 2000). Furthermore, 
teachers in RSS schools are not a separate cadre and teachers may work in RSS schools before 
moving seamlessly into a better-paid job in another school. Some teachers in apparently 
‘secular’ schools are involved in or at least approve of the activities of the Sangh Parivar. But 
teachers do not need to be actively committed to the worldviews of the Sangh Parivar to 
influence the ambience of the schools where they teach: because much Hinduism is ‘banal, 
even well-meaning teachers may peddle it without consciously knowing that is what they are 
doing.  
Educational options, educational outcomes  
Most Muslims in north India, then, face numerous obstacles to obtaining satisfactory 
education for their children, whether in the government or non-state sector. They often share 
some of these hurdles—relative poverty, rural residence—with their non-Muslim neighbours. 
Others particularly affect them as Muslims, since most government and non-state schools are 
alike in being permeated by a Hindi-Hindu educational culture—sanskritised Hindi, upper 
caste Hindu—that is problematic for children from Muslim homes. How, then, do Muslim 
parents deal with the challenges of providing their children with education? Here, we want to 
stress the diversity of the educational careers of Muslim children in north India.  
For the vast majority—the urban poor and most villagers—lengthy education may 
simply not be an affordable or feasible option. In many poor urban neighbourhoods and 
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increasingly in the villages, too, Muslim children are now attending madrasahs. 
Unfortunately, neither Drèze and Gazdar (1997: 72) nor Srivastava (2001: 267) included ‘non-
profit’ or ‘informal’ schooling in their accounts, so we cannot gauge the overall significance of 
madrasahs in Muslim children’s education in UP today. Nevertheless, in our view, 
madrasahs are best understood within the wider political economy of educational provision 
in contemporary UP: essentially, the state and the market alike have failed to create adequate 
provision for Muslim children’s education. Madrasahs are primarily a response to this and 
they go some way to addressing Muslim children’s access to formal education. Poor and rural 
Muslim parents—like many others—complain that non-state schools are too costly or too 
distant, and that government schools are characterised by the lack of committed teachers, the 
failure to teach their pupils, poor facilities and inaccessibility. Many Muslims also say that 
government and non-state schools alike emphasise knowledge and examinations, but that 
their teaching is devoid of ethical content and their ambience is unsympathetic to Islam. Yet 
Muslim parents want their children to have some education and are keenly aware of the costs 
of illiteracy. Where Muslims form a tiny minority of the population, madrasahs are almost 
certainly few in number. In places with sizeable Muslim populations, though, the growing 
numbers of Muslim children of school age and an increasing demand for formal education 
have resulted in a rapid expansion in the madrasah sector during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Madrasahs share many features with other educational institutions (Jeffery et al. 
2004; Jeffery et al. 2005a). Schools and madrasahs are not hermetically sealed from one 
another: individuals or even entire management committees are sometimes involved in 
simultaneously managing schools and madrasahs. As with non-state schools, madrasah 
managers are usually prominent and relatively wealthy members of their locality. Most 
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madrasah teachers come from middle to poor peasant rural backgrounds or from middle 
ranking urban backgrounds. Most male madrasah teachers spent two or more years at one of 
the large seminaries (such as Daru’l `Ulūm in Deoband) whilst the small number of women 
teachers have mainly been educated informally. Teaching in a madrasah—like teaching in 
most non-state schools—is poorly paid, although it is respectable white-collar work. Teachers 
in schools and madrasahs have similar educational philosophies: for instance, in their 
preoccupation with ‘discipline’ and the need for ‘moral education’ to be centrally placed in the 
curriculum, in their understandings of how children learn and the importance of teachers’ 
civilising role. Madrasahs and school pupils alike are punished if they do not practise bodily 
self-control in the classroom, fail to sit still and with correct postures, display disobedience or 
disrespect for their instructors, do not learn their lessons assiduously, and or fail to pick up 
their instructors’ linguistic styles and manners. The same range of views towards the form of 
that punishment can be found amongst schoolteachers and madrasah staff alike: some 
consider the threat of physical punishment the only reliable way of maintaining classroom 
discipline and ensuring that children study diligently, while others vehemently oppose 
corporal punishment and consider that pupils’ misdemeanours should be dealt with only 
through verbal chastisement and shaming. 
The expansion of madrasahs has been possible only because of the growing affluence 
of some sectors of the Muslim population (for instance, those who have benefited from 
agricultural developments, or from migration to the Gulf). Unlike non-state schools that rely 
on pupils’ fees, madrasahs are funded by subscriptions collected through networks of traders, 
landowners and others within the locality or in more distant places, such as Mumbai and 
Surat. By contrast, SCs and other poor communities cannot readily fund educational 
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institutions comparable to madrasahs as they generally lack networks with the economic and 
geographical spread of some Muslim ones. Nevertheless, given Muslims’ relative poverty, 
madrasah funding is erratic and unpredictable. Most madrasahs are poorly resourced—a 
quality they share with government schools and smaller non-state schools, but not with the 
exclusive and expensive private schools in towns. A minority of madrasahs have extensive 
premises and hundreds of students, some of whom are boarders. Most, however, have only 
one or two teachers and a handful of pupils, and they would more usually be termed ‘maktab’, 
since they cater for young children, mainly from poor backgrounds. These provide only a very 
limited curriculum, with Urdu and reciting the Qur’ān Sharīf occupying prominent positions. 
Most cannot offer instruction in Arabic and Farsi language and other advanced Islamic 
subjects. Whilst madrasah teachers prioritise Islamic subjects, however, they are rarely 
opposed to ‘this-worldly education’. Indeed, some madrasahs have UP state recognition to 
teach Hindi and other subjects in the UP curriculum up to Class 5, although even employing 
Hindi and English teachers is constrained by finances. Usually, madrasahs charge no fees for 
instruction in Urdu and the Islamic curriculum, but they might require parents to purchase 
books and other resources needed for Hindi, English and ‘this-worldly’ education—a serious 
deterrent for poor parents. Few madrasahs, though, can contemplate extending and 
‘modernising’ their curricula by introducing subjects such as science and computing, 
purchasing equipment and teaching materials, and employing well-trained staff on attractive 
salaries and conditions.  
For the most part, madrasahs provide poor Muslims with a means of educating their 
children. Muslim parents’ preferences for madrasahs over schools rest on their accessibility 
and low cost, their safe, user-friendly environment and the conscientious teaching, as well as 
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‘moral education’ from an Islamic perspective (Engineer 2001; Sikand 2001b). Better, they 
say, a madrasah education than no education at all. Madrasah pupils, then, are mainly young 
children who generally have rather short educational careers. Most boys attend for a few 
years—often irregularly—and discontinue their studies by the age of 10 or so, before becoming 
functionally literate in Urdu, let alone in Hindi. Girls seem more likely to continue attending 
until they are about 12, or when they reach puberty.  
<Tables 1 and 2 about here> 
But madrasahs are only a part of the story of Muslim education in Bijnor—and by the 
secondary stage they are relatively insignificant, mostly providing just out-of-hours Islamic 
education for children who have not already learned to read Arabic and the Qur’an. 
Supposedly ‘secular’ schools provide schooling for substantial numbers of Muslims children 
who live in towns or are accessible to them. The vast majority of secondary-age Muslim 
children who are still in school are following the UP Board Hindi-medium curriculum. As we 
noted above, this means that these children must put their Muslim identities in cold storage 
whilst in school, since this curriculum is shot through with assumptions that the ‘normal’ 
student is a Hindu, one for who stories of the Hindu gods and Sanskritised vocabulary is 
familiar. Because secondary school pupils also face pressures to take private tuitions in their 
school subjects, their overloaded daily routines tend to compromise either Muslim children’s 
attention to Islamic studies or their school subjects or both.  
 Where there are sizeable concentrations of Muslims—as is the case in most towns of 
western UP, including Bijnor—local Muslims have established schools and colleges, not only 
catering for Muslim children but recruiting fair numbers of (mostly Scheduled Caste) Hindu 
children as well. There are also some Muslim-run schools in larger villages, although they are 
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as reliant on having enough people able to pay the fees as are other non-state schools.7 In 
Bijnor town, for instance, Muslim committees have founded several schools. As yet there are 
no fully English-medium schools in Bijnor under Muslim management, but one has struggled 
to establish an English-medium stream. The other Muslim schools offer educational facilities 
on a par with those provided in other schools in the same price bracket. In the Bijnor area, at 
any rate, these schools are all Hindi-medium and follow the UP curriculum. The three largest 
Muslim-run institutions all offer Urdu as an optional subject. Thus, they perhaps result rather 
less in the erasure of their pupils’ Muslim identities.  
But children who go to ordinary schools—the majority of urban Muslims—are 
nonetheless being left behind in other ways as well. Our data from Bijnor show that patterns 
of secondary school-going vary by religion in significant ways. These are the schools that have 
the most impact on future work and marriage opportunities. Until 1991 almost all such 
schools in UP (outside the metropolitan areas) were Hindi-medium and either fully- or part-
funded by the Government. The major change since 1991 has been the rise in non-State 
schooling, both English- and Hindi-medium. Until 1991 almost all secondary school pupils in 
Bijnor town attended Government or Government-aided Hindi-medium schools, of two 
kinds: relatively well-funded Government and aided schools that continued to class 10 or 
class 12 (the latter known as Intermediate Colleges) and relatively poorly funded Middle 
Schools (teaching only to Class 8). Muslim children were under-represented in the former but 
                                                 
7 In recent years (when the BJP was in power in UP) they claim to have faced problems of getting 
recognition from government, or in being allowed to refill posts that have become vacant. Almost all 
school managers—Hindu or Muslim—told the same kinds of stories, so we do not know if there was a 
deliberate policy to make life difficult for Muslim-run institutions. 
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over-represented in the latter. Muslim children remain under-represented in the Government 
and aided Intermediate Colleges. In the boys’ colleges, about 22% of the pupils are Muslim; in 
the girls’ colleges, the figure is about 20% (whereas the population of the catchment area is 
probably 0ver 50% Muslim). Because there are more boys in total in these schools, this means 
that there are more Muslim girls in this category of schooling than Muslim boys. 
Beyond that, however, different patterns emerge for boys and for girls. In the rapidly-
growing English-medium schools, much the most expensive and highest status, Muslim form 
only 13% of girl pupils, but 20% of boys. Although boys from all religious communities 
outnumber girls in this form of schooling, for Muslims the disparity is even more marked, 
with nearly three times as many Muslim boys as Muslim girls getting English-medium 
schooling.8 In private Hindi-medium schools, the second-fastest growing category, there are 
almost exactly the same number of Muslim boys and Muslim girls. But whereas almost all the 
girls (87%) are in Muslim-run schools, boys are more widely spread, with 62% in Muslim-run 
schools, and 36% in those run by Hindus (the remainder are in the one school set up by a 
Scheduled Caste group. 
In the long term, if these trends continue, and Government and aided schools continue 
to be privatised, charging higher admission and tuition fees, we suspect both that the total 
numbers of Muslim pupils will not grow as fast as the numbers from other religious 
communities, and that there will be an increasing separation of pupils. Already, hardly any 
caste Hindu children attend schools run by Muslims or by SC managers. We predict that this 
will become the norm, and (rather as in Northern Ireland) schooling will be increasingly 
                                                 
8 Two of the five English-medium schools did not provide a breakdown of pupils by religion, so 
these figures are based on the other three schools, with about half the total pupils in this sector. 
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segregated. This does not have to be the case: one English-medium school, responding to its 
competitive situation, has a mixed management committee, and although the principal is 
Hindu, the school teaches Urdu to those children who want to learn, as part of a clear strategy 
to recruit more Muslim pupils.  
 
Transitions to adulthood 
As with many other aspects of Muslim Indian experiences, the effects of schooling 
experiences vary dramatically by class, and for urban and rural groups. Muslim children’s 
educational experiences are diversified and fragmented. Urban middle class Muslim children 
generally have very different experiences of education from rural and poor children, 
experiences much more similar to those of Hindus from similar backgrounds. These 
similarities should be borne in mind in what follows.  
At the top of the economic scale, and especially for children living in urban areas, the 
educational options are much wider, and they have a wider range of occupational options. 
Like some children from moderately wealthy rural backgrounds, they are much more likely to 
have attended a school than a madrasah, and to have continued in formal education at least 
through secondary schooling, and possibly at degree colleges.  
On the face of it, Muslim children from such homes seem the most likely to become 
successfully integrated into the Indian ‘mainstream’, but this might be too facile a conclusion.  
For the urban middle class boys, attending school, gaining the skills and credentials relevant 
for moving into white-collar employment and maintaining and even improving their life styles 
are aspirations that they might realistically share with others from similar class backgrounds. 
Girls from the same families will probably also attend school, though not necessarily for as 
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long as their brothers. Generally, girls’ education in such families is an important currency in 
the marriage market—although many middle class parents, Muslim and Hindu alike, are 
increasingly ready to countenance girls’ education as a means of ensuring that their daughters 
can ‘stand on their legs’ in the event of problems in their adult lives, such as widowhood or 
divorce.  
But there are limitations on the extent to which Muslim boys are able to enter the 
labour market on equal terms with Hindus of comparable economic standing. Their aim for 
mainstream incorporation is not always successful: they are trying to enter employment 
markets that are very problematic, particularly if they look for work in the kinds of jobs for 
which there are few family or community precedents.9 New job-seekers need ‘pioneers’ who 
can sponsor young men into jobs, and Muslims often do not have plausible kinship and trust 
based networks that they can operate in order to enter new kinds of work. They are more 
likely to follow established links, for example to work in cities in India—for the most part 
small employers rely primarily on their own kinship networks to recruit—or in the Gulf States 
(with all the downside of being exploited labour, separated from families and discontented 
with their civil status).10  
Boys from families who do not have the economic, social and cultural capital necessary to get 
their children into ‘good’ schools (whether the handful of good Government or aided schools, 
                                                 
9 This point also applies to other historically marginalised communities, like the Scheduled Castes, 
of course. 
10 Men in such circumstances are often regarded as particularly vulnerable to recruitment to 
fundamentalist movements, but we have no evidence that this is true for young Muslim men from 
Bijnor.  
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or the increasingly expensive private Hindi- or English-medium schools, have little incentive 
to stay the course to the end of upper primary (class 8) or secondary (class 10 or class 12) 
schooling, if ‘secular’ schooling is chosen for them. Whether they leave after five or eight years 
of schooling, their level of literacy will leave them at distinct disadvantages in dealing with the 
public sphere of newspapers, Government offices and official notices. Such boys will tend to 
move into the occupations of their fathers (farming, small businesses, artisanal positions 
whether ‘traditional’ like butchery, or ‘modern’ such as car maintenance). Increasingly, 
competition is limiting the amount of work they will be able to get in this way, especially if 
they are a second or higher parity son. Boys in these positions turn to migration to towns and 
cities, usually following existing migration chains. In the case of boys we know in Bijnor, the 
growing area of employment is in machine embroidery in Delhi (at least while the 
Government clamp-down on ‘polluting industries’ is in abeyance). Such work may be 
relatively well-paid, and does not depend on book qualifications: but it is not clear for how 
long young men can continue with such work before their eyes or dexterity deteriorate. Here 
at least, however, Muslims seem to operate at a relative advantage compared to young SC 
men.  
For madrasah pupils, the minority who have only Islamic training find this no bar to 
gaining admission to one of the larger Islamic seminaries. For them, higher training in 
Islamic subjects may open the way to posts such as maulwī or imām, one of the very few ways 
in which those versed in Islamic subjects can use their education directly and in a respected 
(though not lucrative) fashion. These positions are not always regarded as second best to 
white collar secular occupations: we were often told that the ability to memorise so much, and 
in Arabic, was an accomplishment that was available to few boys, and a certain kudos 
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attached itself to their achievements. These young men may also have a strong religious 
commitment; but whether or not this was true, some of these young men seem the least 
discontented of those we know; and more generally, madrasahs represent a positive assertion 
of Muslim identity that offers an attractive alternative to the ‘secular’ world. But it is 
important to remember also that not all those with a higher Islamic qualification go onto 
religious occupations, but may gain additional certificates or become involved in the family 
enterprises, whether as traders, landlords or artisans. The maulwī identity, however, is one 
that is a public statement of a commitment to Islam, an implicit critique of westernisation, 
and sometimes of consumerism and modern sector jobs. 
 Madrasah education is a positive choice for only a tiny minority, however.  
Madrasah education does little to enhance pupils’ capacity to deploy their skills in the 
employment market, to engage with a world in which Hindi and English dominate, or to 
access non-Muslim networks that might open up routes into a wider range of jobs. Boys who 
have only four or five years of madrasah schooling usually move straight into work on the 
family farm, employment as agricultural labourers and unskilled manual labourers (rickshaw 
pullers, head-loaders etc.), or take up apprenticeships for a craft skill, either in the local town 
or in places such as Delhi, Surat or Kashmir. Madrasah education and Urdu have largely 
become a fallback option for poor Muslims—a remarkable change from the earlier prestige of 
those learned in Urdu (and Farsi and Arabic), the religious scholars and lawyers, the urban 
elites and literati. 
Most girls in all classes and communities are rarely being educated primarily for 
employment outside the home (although some parents consider a girl’s education important 
in case she needs to seek employment later on). Nowadays, however, having some education 
The Future of Muslims in India/ Investing in the Future 23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
is important in the efforts by Muslim parents to arrange ‘good’ marriages for their daughters 
because boys are said to want educated brides, even if they are not highly educated 
themselves (Hasan & Menon 2004; Jeffery et al. 2004). For Muslim girls from poor 
households, madrasah education provides basic knowledge of Islamic practice and belief, and 
tries to inculcate demure behaviour. Rural Muslim girls’ enrolment in formal education in 
madrasahs increased particularly strikingly in the 1990s, indicating parental responsiveness 
to changes in the accessibility of educational facilities, in the significance of girls’ education in 
the marriage market and, to a much lesser extent, in the employment market.  
Rightly, poor Muslim parents do not perceive madrasah education as an effective 
passport to social mobility and secure, prestigious, well-paid employment for their sons. 
Rightly, too, many Muslim parents also do not believe that any kind of formal education can 
provide an escape from poverty. They consider it futile to spend their scarce resources on 
educating their children in poor quality schools, because their children will fail to obtain 
credentials and they themselves lack the social contacts and financial resources necessary to 
facilitate a successful transition into employment (Jeffery & Jeffery 1997: 179ff.).  In other 
words, it cannot enable Muslim children to overcome established processes of social and 
economic exclusion that perpetuate inequalities through the generations. On the contrary, it 
may—we presume unintentionally—be fostering their reinforcement (Ahmad 2000). 
Madrasahs as fall back position for most : followed by apprenticeships, use their ethnic 
contacts into craft and artisan work in urban areas. In face of consumerism and lack of access 
to employment?? —these are likely to be disaffected, those who see the prizes of modernity 
and money eluding them. Urban employment and changes in villages????  
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both  to continue in formal education after puberty. Only they could imagine futures in which 
good marriages were arranged for their daughters and employment opportunities opened up 
for their sons.  
 
Conclusion 
Recent public debate in India has tended to exoticise madrasahs as primarily ‘Islamic’ 
institutions. Madrasahs have become crucial ciphers in communal politics. They have often 
been seen as evidence of Muslims’ supposed introversion, conservatism and lack of 
patriotism. The Hindu Right has vilified them as training grounds for Islamic fundamentalists 
and terrorists, or as hideouts for the banned SIMI (Students Islamic Movement of India), for 
Pakistani spies and for arms stashes (Godbole 2001; Kumar 2000b; Sikand 2001a).11 At 
various times in the past decade or so, several kinds of state intervention have been proposed 
to regulate and inspect madrasahs, to oversee or dictate their curricula, to insist that they are 
registered with the government, even to close them down.  Often, proposals to exercise 
control over (but not fund) madrasahs reflect an anti-democratic political agenda, rather 
than an (ostensible) concern with educational standards. Government attempts to reform 
madrasahs have been neither credible nor successful.  
Moreover, the verbal battles and allegations about madrasahs tend to distract 
attention from the more pressing issue: the widespread and established processes of social 
and economic exclusion in UP, to which madrasahs themselves have been one response. 
Currently, madrasahs in UP are performing an important educational role for Muslims, 
                                                 
11 Times of India, Hindustan Times, Amar Ujāla, and the RSS weekly Organiser have carried 
numerous news and comment articles on this subject over the past couple of years.  
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especially for the urban poor and for villagers. Given the other alternatives that are available 
to such sectors, it is far from clear that madrasahs are providing an especially poor 
educational option. Nevertheless, as educational institutions, madrasahs certainly are 
problematic. Most of their pupils will remain illiterate in Hindi, and possibly barely literate 
even in Urdu. Poor resourcing and their continuing emphasis on Urdu and Islamic subjects 
suggest limits to extent to which they will be likely to change. In the present state of 
communal politics, moreover, attempts to reform madrasahs may not only be ineffective but 
also counterproductive. 
In any case, Muslim parents generally are willing (in principle at least) to educate their 
children in schools, provided they are affordable, accessible and non-threatening for their 
children. Indeed, evidence from around the country indicates that Muslim parents enrol their 
children in schools, if they can afford to (Hasan & Menon 2004).  The expansion of the 
madrasah sector in UP, then, would probably not have been so rapid if enough schools had 
met the (perfectly reasonable) expectations of Muslim parents. Making a frontal attack on 
madrasahs would probably precipitate a defensive response from what is already an 
embattled minority. Rather, investing in Muslim-friendly schools—schools in the right places, 
with sufficient facilities and committed staff, and with the worst excesses of saffronisation 
removed—would draw in Muslim children.  This would probably also reduce the role of 
madrasahs in Muslim children’s education to places that teach religious subjects out of 
school hours (as is already effectively the case amongst the urban middle classes). But any 
such suggestions will be hard to implement, since the UP state is not in position to do much. 
As the market takes an increasing role, the problems over getting enough affordable schools 
are likely to increase. Only where Muslims are numerous and include a relatively affluent 
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middle class sector will there by provision targeted at their interests. So we should not assume 
that more schools will be a panacea. 
We should not let the madrasah issue distract us from wider considerations about 
education in UP more broadly, and for Muslims in particular, and the problems with 
madrasahs are only part of the story. Indeed, a fixation with madrasahs distracts attention 
from some serious processes at work in the school sector. Although the direct threats to 
minority schools have retreated, now that the BJP is not in power either at State or national 
level, the situation is still bleak. Where there is a critical mass of Muslims, there will be 
madrasahs and private schools; where there is no critical mass, there would probably be 
nothing at all or only maktabs, masquerading as madrasahs. 
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Table 1: Teachers in Secondary Schools in Bijnor Town, 2001-02 
Teachers Hindu Muslim SC and Other Total 
Government and Government-Aided High Schools and Inter-Colleges 
Male 90 34 8 132 
Female 77 32 9 118 
English-medium Schools (including pre-secondary teachers) 
Male 40 3 1 44 
Female 108 19 8 135 
Hindi-medium Schools (including pre-secondary teachers) 
Muslim-run, Male 0 0 0 0 
Muslim-run, Female 20 20 2 42 
SC-run, Male 0 0 0 0 
SC-run, Female 2 0 4 6 
Hindu-run, Male 13 0 3 16 
Hindu-run, Female 78 3 5 86 
Total: Male 143 (74%) 37 (19%) 12 (6%) 192 
Total: Female 285 (74%) 74 (19%) 28 (7%) 387 
Source: Authors’ survey of secondary schools, October-January, 2001-02. Figures 
include teachers on permanent salaries as well as those on part-time and/or temporary 
contracts. 
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Table 2: Distribution of Muslim pupils by School type, Bijnor town, 2001-02 
Pupils Hindu and 
others 
SC Muslim Total 
Government and Government aided schools 
Girls 2970 (50%) 888 (15%) 2084 (35%) 5942 (100%) 
Boys 3499 (57%) 1249 (20%) 1369 (22%) 6117 (100%) 
Unaided English-medium schools 
Girls  284 (87%) 43 (13%) 327 (100%) 
Boys 581 (83%) 123 (17%) 704 (100%) 
Unaided Hindi-medium schools 
Muslim-run: 
Girls 
0 (0%) 11 (10%) 104 (90%) 115 (100%) 
Boys 1 (1%) 7 (9%) 74 (90%) 82 (100%) 
SC-run: Girls 1 (8%) 10 (77%) 2 (15%) 13 (100%) 
Boys 3 (21%) 9 (64%) 2 (14%) 14 (100%) 
Hindu-run: 
Girls 
178 (77%) 39 (17%) 14 (6%) 231 (100%) 
Boys 281 (71%) 71 (18%) 43 (11%) 395 (100%) 
 
Note: Data collected by authors in 2001. Communal breakdown was not provided of 199 
pupils in four Hindi-medium schools, and of 924 pupils in two English-medium schools.
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